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Antitrust doctrine adopted the Chicago School’s narrow consumer welfare and
economic efficiency analysis in the early 1970s. Since then, enforcement has drastically reduced,
and market concentration has substantially increased. But the Chicago School is not true to
either the intent of the original antitrust legislation – the Sherman Act – nor to the ‘economist’
they adopted as their ultimate advocate, Adam Smith. The Chicago School has cherry picked
Adam Smith’s written works to support market deregulation and the existence of a perfectly
efficient, rational marketplace, but this is not an accurate rendition of his works. Rather, Adam
Smith was a philosopher who emphasized humans are more than homo economicus; the market
requires morality and social support to function. The absence of fairness and morality from
antitrust analyses allows for court decisions like Ohio v. Am. Express Co., mergers like that
between AT&T and Time Warner, and monopolies like Amazon to continue existing without
challenge.
Adding fairness to the equation is one method of encouraging competition and leveling the
playing field. The Sherman Act’s legislators and Adam Smith explicitly contemplate fairness and
morality. The courts are already equipped to judge fairness in complex economic and businesscentered cases. Legislators are currently pushing to give government antitrust enforcers more
power to regulate, but the courts must also be prepared to deal with lawsuits challenging
anticompetitive behavior. Fairness is one factor easily supported by intent, history, reason, and
necessity.
ABSTRACT.
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INTRODUCTION

Antitrust law, on its face, is boring. Very few members of the public beyond
legal and economic academia would deign to admit they found interest in the
minutia of merger agreements and contractual provisions designed to compete
with other market participants. Yet the past several years have brought antitrust
theory to the forefront of popular news topics discussing growing wealth gaps and
large companies dominating different market sectors. Monopolies, many agree,
are one root of inequality. One company can dominate a sector of the market
through different methods, drive the price of a given commodity up, and severely
impact the average American. Below the surface of the public’s agreement that
monopolies are bad, however, are two general and divergent schools of thought for
how and when to address monopolization and anticompetitive practices.
A diametric opposition divides the conversation. The Chicago School of
Thought focuses on laissez-faire policies, economic efficiency, and consumer
welfare. The antitrust scholar group, informally known as the ‘Hipster Antitrust’
movement, focuses on reinvigorating simultaneous moral, political, and economic
considerations. 1 The former argues that low prices make consumers happy, and
that antitrust law protects competition, but does not safeguard “inefficient” firms.2
The latter argues that “rather than merely analyzing whether corporate actions
result in lower consumer prices, the law should recognize that the excessive
concentration of economic power in a handful of large companies is inherently bad,
because it exacerbates other ills, such as income inequality and labor abuses, and
gives undue political influence to too few people.”3 Despite antitrust law’s origins
in “deep suspicion of concentrated private power, [antitrust] now often promote[s]
it.”4
The latter argument is consistent with the spirit of antitrust laws and
antimonopoly sentiment promulgated from the late 18th century and the founding
fathers to legislators of the Sherman Act of 1890. The applicability of relatively ‘old’

See Charles E. Elder, “Hipster Antitrust” Movement Takes Center Stage in Congress, Lexology
(Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e28ec218-5d59-461c-8559-51c927
00aea2 [https://perma.cc/47KA-Z6J4].

1

See Whet Moser, The Tide is Turning Against Tech’s Monopolies – Because of U. of C., Chicago Mag
(Sept. 20, 2017, 10:47 AM), https://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/september-2017/university-ofchicago-big-tech-monopoly/ [https://perma.cc/E6VX-SCW9].

2

3

See Elder, supra note 1.

David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y. Times
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-antitrust-linakhan-amazon.html?searchResultPosition=3 [https://perma.cc/S4HD-JA6K].

4
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precedent has not diminished in recent years. Growing wealth inequalities have
spurred hoary philosophies to new use. Since March 2020, while most Americans
have suffered under the economic consequences of the pandemic, U.S. billionaires
have amassed more than $1.2 trillion – up more than 44% - in growth.5 While those
affected most by high unemployment rates have fought for comparatively small
stimulus checks to assist with living expenses, billionaires’ wealth gain over the past
11 months would be enough to pay each of the 331 million Americans $3900.6 Jeff
Bezos, former CEO of Amazon, and current centi-billionaire, saw his wealth grow
from $113 billion in March to $189.3 billion.7 If Bezos’s wealth increase alone was
distributed across his 810,000 U.S. employees – whose median pay was just over
$35,000 in 2019 – he could give a $94,000 bonus to each employee without growing
“any ‘poorer’ than he was 11 months ago.”8
But how does antitrust law begin to address wealth inequalities and serious
concerns over increased market concentration? First, antitrust ought to go beyond
the Chicago School’s economic efficiency and consumer welfare considerations.
Rather, it should contemplate how fairness and morality concerns fit into the
judicial analysis and return to the original values imbued in antitrust history. At the
legal system’s core and sewn into the fabric of law are the “conceptions of fairness,
justice, and equality.” 9 While the inclusion of “non-economic aims in the
substantial assessment of anticompetitive practices” usually results in “all doctrinal
hell break[ing] loose[,]” it is only “natural that aiming for fair competition would be
expected from antitrust legislation.”10
This paper will first address the history of antitrust prior to the Chicago School
of Thought through the founders’ considerations of monopolies when writing the
constitution and legislative intent supporting the introduction of the Sherman Act
in Part I. Part II will explain the current Chicago School of Thought, the
inconsistencies of its position with Adam Smith’s work, and the multitude of ways
the Chicago School has failed to address consumers and exacerbated inequalities by
not considering fairness and morality as part of the analysis. Finally, Part III will
Chuck Collins, Updates: Billionaire Wealth, U.S. Job Losses and Pandemic Profiteers,
Inequality.org (Feb. 24, 2021), https://inequality.org/great-divide/updates-billionairepandemic/ [https://perma.cc/NFA4-3FGS].

5

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

Sandra Marco Colino, The Antitrust F Word: Fairness Considerations in Competition Law, The
Chinese Univ. of H.K., Sept. 2018, at 2 (quoting Judge James Allsop).

9

10

Id.
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note the growing movement to reinvigorate antitrust law, and how courts might
employ fairness and morality considerations.
I.

ANTITRUST HISTORY PRIOR TO THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

The threat of monopolies and oligopolies is not a recent concern. The founders,
while writing the U.S. Constitution, pushed for an anti-monopoly clause in the
document that would govern the nation. 11 It should first be recognized that the
monopolies the founders were concerned with were government monopolies; there
were no concentrations of industrial power. The Constitution is only concerned
with the people versus the government, but that does not diminish the founders’
concern about the concentration of power, regardless of who held that power.
This vitriol for monopolies was equated to the need for a bill of rights. Thomas
Jefferson, in a letter to James Madison, wrote that “a bill of rights is what the people
are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what
no just government should refuse” and that he did not like the “omission of a bill of
rights providing clearly and without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion,
freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, [and] restriction against
monopolies[.]”12 While Jefferson argued it was better to “abolish . . . Monopolies, in
all cases, than not to do it in any[,]” Madison argued monopolies ought be allowed
in the limited circumstances where they encourage literary works “and ingenious
discoveries.”13 Madison clarified that monopolies were “justly classed among the
greatest nuisances in Government.”14 Though Madison ultimately omitted an antimonopoly clause from the Bill of Rights, he made clear:
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary
restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to it part of its citizens that free use of
their faculties, and free choice of their occupations, which not only constitute their
property in the general sense of the world; but are the means of acquiring property
strictly so called.15

What is clear from Madison’s strong assertions about monopolistic behavior
Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa Price, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony
Capitalism 29 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of L. Scholarly Commons, Working Paper No. 214, 2012).

11

12

Id. at 30 (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison).

13

Id. at 30–31.

14

Id.

Id. at 36, citing James W. Ely, To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation: The Evolutions of
Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 917, 931 (2006) (quoting
James Madison, Property (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted in 1 The Founder’s Constitution: Major
Themes 598, 598 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).

15
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and citizens’ rights against that behavior is the consistent attitude that monopolies
are ‘evils.’ This moral characterization indicates that as early as the late 18th century
– and likely earlier – monopolies were intrinsically connected to aspects of fairness.
Neither founder’s comments were predicated on how monopolies might benefit
consumer welfare or overall decrease prices; their opinions were founded on what
was beneficial for the greater good. Madison asserted, “[m]onopolies are sacrifices
of the many to the few. Where the power is in the few it is natural for them to
sacrifice the many to their own partialities and corruptions.”16
The true advent of antitrust law in the United States, however, emerged in the
late 19th century. Emerging antitrust policy during this time period was based
largely on moral and political forces. 17 Wealth was concentrated in a select few
wealthy capitalists looking to further gain market power and accumulate more
wealth across a developing nation. Early legislation seeking to break up these trusts
were “fought not by economists, but in the political and moral sphere.”18 The first
major antitrust policy was enacted in 1890: the Sherman Act was a “comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as
the rule of trade.”19 As one of several core antitrust laws, its goal is to “protect the
process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there are strong
incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality
up.” 20 Penalties under the statute – both civil and criminal – are severe, with
criminal penalties reaching up to $100 million for corporations, or double the
amount for conspirators of antitrust violations gained from illegal acts or double the
amount lost by those affected by the antitrust violations if prosecuted under federal
law.21
Section 2 of the Sherman Act explicitly makes it illegal to “monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations.”22 This Section is used to break concentrations of power, and guard
Id. (quoting 1 Bernard Schwartz, the Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 614–18
(1971) (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788)).

16

William Murphy & Raymond Friel, Free or Fair: a New Paradigm for Competition Policy?, 27 Com.
L. Prac. 207, 208 (Nov. 2020).

17

18

Id.

The Antitrust Laws, Federal Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/A7EQ-8H4D].

19

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

15 U.S.C. § 2.
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“against the use of monopoly to unfairly block competition, fix prices, gain a
competitive advantage or destroy a competitor.”23 By taking action under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, as opposed to Section 1, enforcers do not have to prove an
agreement to participate in price rigging; rather, “the fact that a company possesses
and abuses a high degree of market power warrants antitrust scrutiny under Section
2.”24 Before the 1970s, Section 2 was successful in bringing monopolization cases
against many corporations, including Standard Oil, but the modern Chicago School
theory has made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to bring a case under this
Section.25
The Chicago School is responsible for taking Section 2 as a functional law and
converting it into a practically unusable, unfeasibly elevated standard. This high
standard – showing an anticompetitive effect, proving the monopoly has market
power, employing expensive economists, and hoping that a judge might weigh the
factors in favor of the plaintiff for once – has been acutely analogized to saying:
We can’t prosecute a mob boss simply for being a mob boss and stealing from the
neighborhood – even though the law bars these activities. Instead, we would also have
to show that he is the only mob boss in town and that he is burning down the offices of
his competitors. But showing burned down buildings and video evidence of the arson
still wouldn’t be enough for the court: we’d have to pay an economist large amounts of
money to validate that the mob boss profited from his scheme more than the victims
lost. And the economist would insist on using expensive cameras and other instruments
to measure the heat of the fire. Together, this discourages prosecutors from taking
cases against mob bosses in the first place.26

The Sherman Act’s legislative history makes clear that this was never intended. In
fact, “[l]egislative history reveals that the idea that ‘Congress designed the Sherman
Act as a “consumer welfare prescription,”’ is wrong.”27 During the passage of the
Sherman Act, Senator John Sherman related a king’s political power with a king’s
power over “the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessities of
life.” 28 Monopolistic overcharging was characterized as “robbery” and “extortion

What You Need to Know About Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Am. Econ. Liberties Project
(Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.economicliberties.us/our-work/section2-explainer/# [https://perma.
cc/DQ6P-FJU8].

23

24

Id.

25

See id.

26

Id.

Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L.J. 710, 739 (2017) (quoting Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)).

27

28

Id. at 740 (quoting 21. Cong. Rec. 2457 (statement of Sen. Sherman)).
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which makes the people poor.”29 Other senators condemned trusts as thievery from
the people and in the case of a beef trust, it “robs the farmer on one hand and the
consumer on the other.”30
The essence of the legislators’ arguments was one of fundamental fairness; the
system of wealth transfer and distribution was so heavily skewed towards already
wealthy individuals while a citizen of ‘regular’ wealth did not benefit. Furthermore,
this feeling of inequality was largely one of principle. In choosing to explicitly
“denounce unjust redistribution,” Congress showed what truly angered the public
was less about “the reduction in their wealth than by the way in which the wealth
was extracted.”31 This wealth transfer from the pockets of the average American to
corporations participating in uncompetitive practices was the primary issue, one
which the public was principally against.
The Sherman Act’s effectiveness against abuse in the marketplace was notably
tested in Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1911). There, the government filed an action
against Standard Oil and 37 other corporations for monopolizing the petroleum
industry and using unfair competition practices, namely predatory pricing through
cutting local prices and squeezing out competition.32 The Court concluded that the
defendants’ actions violated antitrust laws, as their collective actions indicated
“substantial power over the crude product was the inevitable result of the absolute
control which existed over the refined product.” 33 In coming to its holding, the
Court recognized that:
The evils which led to the public outcry against monopolies and to the final denial of the
power to make them may be thus summarily stated: 1. The power which the monopoly

Id. at 740–41 (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 2614 (statement of Sen. Coke) and 21 Cong. Rec. 2461
(1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)).

29

Id. at 741 (quoting 21 Cong. Rec. 4101 (statement of Rep. Heard) and 21 Cong. Rec. 4098
(statement of Rep. Taylor)).

30

31

Id.

Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1911). More specifically, the record
showed a series of averments that the court grouped into several different categories: “Rebates,
preferences and other discriminatory practices in favor of the combination by railroad companies;
restraint and monopolization by control of pipe lines, and unfair practices against competing pipe
lines; contracts with competitors in restraint of trade; unfair methods of competition, such as
local price cutting at the points where necessary to suppress competition; espionage of the
business of competitors, the operation of bogus independent companies, and payment of rebates
on oil…; the division of the United States into districts… so that competition in the sale of
petroleum products between such corporations had been entirely eliminated and destroyed,” and
“enormous and unreasonable profits” as a result of the monopoly.

32

33

Id. at 77.
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gave to the one who enjoyed it to fix the price and thereby injure the public; 2. The power
which it engendered of enabling a limitation on production; and 3. The danger of
deterioration in quality of the monopolized article which it was deemed was the
inevitable result of the monopolistic control over its production and sale.34

At least some of the government’s motivation in Standard Oil was a concern for
fairness. The practices the company employed to cut prices below all other firms,
squeeze out competitors, and then raise the prices once more was classified as an
evil – something so wholly unfair the entire company was broken up by the Court.
While economics played a role in coming to a conclusion, the Court’s holding was
not solely based on a question of what will create the lowest cost for consumers, as
modern antitrust theory asks.
II.

MODERN ANTITRUST THEORY & THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

By the 1970s, a group of neoclassical economists dubbed the Chicago School of
Thought emerged, purporting to have economic efficiency and consumer welfare as
their primary goals. Powerful figures who identified as part of the Chicago School
were offered roles in presidential administrations, appointed to the bench, and
given Nobel prizes in economics. President Ronald Reagan’s appointee to the
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, William Baxter, was unconcerned with
large mergers or “with fairness to small competitors;” rather, he was exclusively
focused on economic efficiency.35 This change in legal thought and practice focused
on short-term consumer interests and considered low prices as sufficient to show
competition.36
Influential antitrust scholar and champion of the Chicago School, Robert Bork,
described this approach to antitrust as a “judge-friendly theory of economics that
allowed judges to dismiss antitrust cases quickly.” 37 Bork’s book, The Antitrust
Paradox, argues that the government places an overemphasis on the role of
competition in the economy; government regulation is used as a means to level “the
playing field for the benefit of poorly run companies.” 38 These “bad” companies,
Bork argued, allowed the government to keep prices higher for the sake of
34

Id. at 52.

Stacy Mitchell, Monopoly Power and the Decline of Small Business, Inst. for Loc. SelfReliance, Aug. 2016, at 11.

35

36

Khan, supra note 27, at 716.

37

Colino, supra note 9, at 3.

Derek Thompson, America’s Monopoly Problem: How Big Business Jammed the Wheels of
Innovation, The Atlantic (Oct. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/
10/americas-monopoly-problem/497549/ [https://perma.cc/9A4D-Q4J3].

38
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competition instead of letting the “most-efficient companies” dominate the
markets.39 And so long as a merger – either horizontal or vertical – would ultimately
lower prices for the consumer, it did not matter what degree of market
concentration or what sort of unfair competition practices the company may have
engaged in. 40 In assuming that markets behaved with perfect efficiency and
dubbing predatory pricing as a “phenomenon that probably does not exist,” it is no
surprise that Bork believed the only question that needs to be asked in antitrust suits
is “[w]hat will most lower prices for consumers?”41 The answer to that question for
Bork is more mergers: let the “most-efficient companies” dominate the market and
build their market concentration. 42 Thus, antitrust law had shifted from
“principally protecting competition to principally protecting consumers.”43
The Reagan administration used Bork’s denunciation of a fairness
consideration and judicial affirmations of efficiency as a “blueprint” to “rewrite the
plot of antitrust along the lines of neoclassical economics and laissez-faireism, a
blueprint which was used to execute a ‘coup against prevailing antitrust thinking.’”44
Motivated by fear of arbitrariness, fairness in antitrust cases has been entirely
rejected since the late 1970s.45
A. Inconsistent Reading of Adam Smith’s Economic Works
What is strange beyond the flaws and inaccuracies of subsuming lower prices
and consumer welfare is the Chicago School’s near idolization of Adam Smith as the
definitive advocate for self-interest and rational behavior in the market. Adam
Smith, author of The Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral Sentiments, was a
Scottish philosopher whose economic thoughts later rooted the works of David
Ricardo, Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes, Milton Friedman, and many others.46
While he is often identified as the “father of modern capitalism,” Adam Smith was
not an economist – he was a philosopher – and the term capitalism “did not enter
39

Id.

40

See id.

Robinson Meyer, How to Fight Amazon (Before You Turn 29), The Atlantic (Aug. 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/07/lina-khan-antitrust/561743/
[https://perma.cc/6NHY-WH3Q].

41

42

Id.

43

Thompson, supra note 38.

44

Colino, supra note 9, at 3.

45

Id.

Adam Smith, Libr. of Econ. & Liberty, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/
Smith.html [https://perma.cc/N5RL-GWES].

46
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into widespread use until the late nineteenth century.” 47 Smith used the phrase
“commercial society,” not capitalism, which emphasizes “his belief that the
economic is only one component of the human condition.”48 The Chicago School
invokes Adam Smith to argue against government intervention and instead let the
“invisible hand” guide the market to “find its equilibrium without government or
other interventions forcing it into unnatural patterns.” 49 But this view of Smith
does not acknowledge his work as a whole. Instead, it extracts affirming theories
while ignoring Smith’s emphasis on sympathy, conscience, benevolence, and
human nature’s value in the market.
George Stigler, a Nobel laureate in economics and Chicago School believer who
has been labeled Adam Smith’s “best friend” for his close affinity to Smith’s theories,
associates Smith with “economics ‘properly done.’”50 Two facets of Smith’s thought
stand as the standard depiction of the Chicago approach: “the efficacy of the system
of natural liberty and the dim view of the abilities of the state to improve on the
outcomes associated with natural liberty.” 51 More specifically, this “system of
natural liberty” is one founded principally in self-interest. 52 The advice Stigler
gleaned from Smith is that “the conduct of economic affairs is best left to private
citizens – that the state will be doing remarkably well if it succeeds in its
unavoidable tasks of winning wars, preserving justice, and maintaining the various
highways of commerce.”53 While government action is not wholly foreclosed (it may
be necessary when an individual “does not know, or does not have the power to
advance, his own interests”), Stigler asserts that Smith “deeply distrusted the state”
and instances needing intervention were limited.54

Jack Russell Weinstein, Adam Smith, Internet Encyclcopedia of Phil., https://iep.
utm.edu/smith/#:~:text=Smith%20was%20not%20an%20economist,beings%20come%20to%20k
now%20them [https://perma.cc/7MEQ-5THU].

47

48

Id.

Christina Majaski & Michael Sonnenshein, Invisible Hand Definition, Investopedia
(last updated Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/invisiblehand.asp
[https://perma.cc/DLP6-K28V].

49

Steven G. Medema, Adam Smith and the Chicago School, The Elgar Companion to the Chi.
Sch. (forthcoming Aug. 2007) (manuscript 2–3).

50

51

Id. at 4.

52

Id. at 5.

Id. at 8 (quoting George Stigler, Presidential Address to the American Economic Association
(Dec. 29, 1964)).

53

54

Medema, supra note 50, at 9.
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This view of Adam Smith, however, is “not homogenous.” 55 This version of
Smith is known as “Chicago Smith” – a Smith whose work is read to correspond
“rather closely with [the Chicago School’s] own rational choice-based analysis of
competitive market structures in an a-institutional context.” 56 There is another
version of Smith known as “Kirkaldy Smith.”57 Kirkaldy Smith is a depiction more
attuned in the “Scottish enlightenment mentality” and more complex than Chicago
Smith in that the Kirkaldy reading makes room for all of Smith’s writings and
historical background.58
Kirkaldy Smith’s rational individual is not exclusively a homo economicus – a
“figurative human being characterized by the infinite ability to make rational
decisions . . . [who] will attempt to maximize their utility for both monetary and
non-monetary gain.”59 Rather, Smith viewed man as one motivated both by selfinterest primarily in the marketplace and as one concerned about the well-being of
others. 60 In order for laissez-faire to work beneficially, human nature’s social
instinct for “sympathy, desire for approval, conscience, and benevolence” were
vital.61 While self-interest was and is a significant factor in market balance, it is by
no means the only factor. To assert that Smith was an unconditional promoter of
self-interest as a regulator ignores the complexity of Smith’s writings, particularly
that he “took no pains to conceal his dislike for some of the forms in which selfinterest manifests itself in trade and industry.” 62 The Kirkaldy Smith is not
single-minded, but influenced by a variety of social and moral factors.
Moreover, Kirkaldy Smith is not so quick to dismiss government intervention.
Scholars identifying with Kirkaldy Smith over Chicago Smith point out that if Smith
had “adopted the term ‘laissez-faire’ as an appropriate label for his own policy views,
he undoubtedly would not have interpreted it literally as a condemnation of all
government interference with the activities of private individuals.”63 Indeed, much
55

Id. at 5.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

Medema, supra note 50, at 10; James Chen & Charles Potter, Homo Economicus, Investopedia
(Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/homoeconomicus.asp#:~:text=Homo%
20economicus%2C%20or%20economic%20human,monetary%20and%20non%2Dmonetary%20g
ains [https://perma.cc/HK5H-NERM].

59

60

See Medema, supra note 50, at 11.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 12.

63

Id. at 13.
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of Smith’s government aversion was rooted in his belief not just that government
action was unnecessary, but also that “‘government action would usually make
matters worse’ – an artifact of governments lacking ‘both the knowledge and the
motivation to do a satisfactory job in regulating an economic system.’” 64 Smith
described politicians as “insidious crafty animal[s]” and presumed incompetence
and corruption.65 Yet these ‘crafty animals’ ought still be permitted to take action
when government intervention was the best option and could be “‘entitled to wider
responsibilities’ if it improved ‘its standards of competence, honesty, and public
spirit.”’66 Is Kirkaldy Smith the solution to America’s antitrust conundrum? Few
legal scholars pushing for a more robust antitrust movement would argue so, but it
is clear that Smith’s legacy in the Chicago School is already inconsistent with Smith’s
own work.
Beyond the Adam Smith dichotomy, a simple analysis of Smith’s thoughts in his
early work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, reveals a more complex assessment of
humans’ self-interest. On sympathy, Smith asserts:
We run not only to congratulate the successful, but to condole with the afflicted; and the
pleasure which we find in the conversation of one whom in all the passions of his heart
we can entirely sympathize with, seems to do more than compensate the painfulness of
that sorrow with which the view of his situation affects us.67

Human nature compels us to relate with one another in degrees of happiness, in
sorrow, in pride, in grief. Ignoring this fundamental factor in humankind is merely
one way the Chicago School can assert self-interest as a sole motivating factor in the
market. Smith quite literally argues with the Chicago School’s own interpretation
of Smith: “Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain
refinements of self-love, think themselves at no loss to account, according to their
own principles, both for this pleasure and this pain.”68 Plainly put, those who only
account for human beings as creatures of selfishness ignore an innate call to
empathy. It is not necessary for the economy to always benefit the greatest number
of consumers; consumers – the same human beings innately empathetic – are not
terribly affected to see the benefits benefit others.69
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Perhaps most applicable to an argument for reapplying a fairness and morality
pillar to the overall economic analysis is Adam Smith’s passage in his same book,
which contains an early reference to the invisible hand:
It is to no purpose, that the proud and unfeeling landlord views his extensive fields, and
without a thought for the wants of his brethren, in imagination consumes himself the
whole harvest that grows upon them. The homely and vulgar proverb, that the eye is
larger than the belly, never was more fully verified than with regard to him. The capacity
of his stomach bears no proportion to the immensity of his desires, and will receive no
more than that of the meanest peasant. The rest he is obliged to distribute among those,
who prepare, in the nicest manner, that little which he himself makes use of, among
those who fit up the palace in which this little is to be consumed, among those who
provide and keep in order all the different baubles and trinkets, which are employed in
the economy of greatness; all of whom thus derive from his luxury and caprice, that
share of the necessaries of life, which they would in vain have expected from his
humanity or his justice. . . . The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and
agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural
selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole
end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the
gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the
produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the
same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth
been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending
it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the
multiplication of the species. When Providence divided the earth among a few lordly
masters, it neither forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the
partition.70

Under the Chicago School’s approach, self-interest and the invisible hand would
guide the landlord to join with every other powerful landlord, concentrate the
“necessaries of life,” and ensure that none of the inhabitants were able to develop
their own necessaries. With this approach, the landlord is motivated only by a want
of wealth and power. Though Smith’s musings could arguably fall under
ill-reasoned trickle-down economics, 71 Smith’s intention with reference to the
is then assured of that assistance; and grieves whenever he observes the contrary, because he is
then assured of their opposition. But both the pleasure and the pain are always felt so
instantaneously, and often upon such frivolous occasions, that it seems evident that neither of
them can be derived from any such self-interested consideration.”).
70
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invisible hand was not one of selfishness, but of overcoming that selfishness
because human nature demands sympathy, or at the very least to be bent to societal
values. Smith believed these powerful actors would be compelled to share their
wealth with the less wealthy simply because an invisible hand – one of fairness and
morality – guides them to split the “necessaries of life” “amongst all its inhabitants”
as if the earth were equally divided.72
To understand Adam Smith’s work, one must consider what each individual
struggles with:
including those that emphasize the relationship of morality and economics. Smith asks
why individuals should be moral. He offers models for how people should treat
themselves and others. He argues that scientific methods can lead to moral discovery,
and he presents a blueprint for a just society that concerns itself with its least well-off
members, not just those with economic success. Adam Smith’s philosophy bears little
resemblance to the libertarian caricature put forth by proponents of laissez faire
markets who describe humans solely as homo economicus.73

There are external forces that overcome tendencies of self-interest and disfigure a
homo economicus beyond recognition. But for Adam Smith, the “market is a
mechanism of morality and social support.”74
B. Where the Chicago School Has Failed Consumers
It is not enough to simply muse about the inconsistencies between the Chicago
School’s approach to economics and Adam Smith’s theories of self-interest and
conclude that there are more factors at play for individual actors in the market. The
past several decades are filled with examples of how the Chicago School’s failure to
account for morality and fairness has led to consequences which injure the public,
even if prices for consumers were low. The law presumes that all market actors act
rationally, but competition “can pressure companies to engage in unethical or
criminal behavior, if doing so yields the firm a relative competitive edge.”75 Firms,
whether they wish to act rationally or irrationally, are forced into a corner; “as
competition increases, and profit margins decrease, firms have greater incentive to
engage in unethical behavior that improve their costs (relative to competitors).
Other firms, given the cost disadvantage, face competitive pressure to follow; such
competition collectively leaves the firms and society worse off.” 76 The choice to
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compete fairly or participate in anticompetitive practices is not much of a choice for
even rational market participants when the playing field is vastly unequal.
C. Ohio v. Am. Express Co.
In 2018, the Supreme Court delivered a significant blow to hopes of progressive
antitrust enforcement when they found in favor of a firm participating in
anticompetitive practices by placing theory before the facts of the case.77 Ruled by a
5-4 opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Court in Ohio v. Am. Express Co. found
the defendant had not violated federal antitrust law and essentially held that “even
though, in practice, Amex hurt competition and inflicted harm on consumers, . . .
the company was not, in theory, powerful enough to do so.”78 The plaintiffs in Ohio
v. Am. Express Co., composed of several states and the federal government, brought
a case against Amex under a claim that Amex’s anti-steering provisions – a clause
which “prohibits businesses from encouraging customers to use a lower cost card
when they try to pay with an American Express card” – violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.79
The plaintiffs argued that the issues of credit cards should be treated as two
markets: one for cardholders, one for merchants.80 After seven weeks of trial, the
district court found in favor of the government with thorough factual findings –
none of which the Supreme Court engaged with.81 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan, noted in dissent that in five years,
Amex “raised the prices it charged merchants on 20 separate occasions” without
increasing benefits or cutting credit card prices for cardholders “in tandem with the
merchant price increases.”82 Further, the district court found that Amex clearly held
relevant market power because they did not lose any “meaningful market share”
when they raised prices.83
77

See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2279 (2018).

Tim Wu, The Supreme Court Devastates Antitrust Law, N.Y. Times (June 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/opinion/supreme-court-american-express.html%20%
5baccessed%2015%20August%202018 [https://perma.cc/WLF9-DN8D].

78

Ben Dwyer, American Express Anti-Steering Supreme Court Case, CardFellow (May 14, 2019),
https://www.cardfellow.com/blog/american-express-anti-steering-supreme-court-case/#:~:text
=American%20Express'%20merchant%20agreement%20includes,with%20an%20American%20E
xpress%20card [https://perma.cc/8MDS-YF6V]; Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2283.

79

80

Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2283.

81

Id. at 2293 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

82

Id.

83

Id.

210

UNCLOAKING THE INVISIBLE HAND

The plaintiffs and Amex both acknowledged the anti-steering provisions were
vertical restraints – “restraints ‘imposed by agreement between firms at different
levels of distribution’” – which are considered under a “rule of reason.” 84 The
majority engaged with the three-step burden-shifting analysis to determine
whether the anti-steering provisions violated the rule of reason; the first step
requires plaintiffs to carry the initial burden of proving an anticompetitive effect
resulted from Amex’s anti-steering provision.85 The Court never went beyond this
first step. In determining that the plaintiffs had not carried their burden, the Court
stated that “focusing on merchant fees alone misses the mark because the product
that credit card companies sell is transactions, not services to merchants” and
evidence of increased prices does not demonstrate “an anticompetitive exercise of
market power.”86 In order to carry their burden, the plaintiffs would have had to
prove the provisions “increased the cost of credit card transactions above a
competitive level, reduced the number of credit card transactions, or otherwise
stifled competition in the credit card market.” 87 Failure to make this showing
resulted in judgment for Amex.
The government had filed the lawsuit seeking “to restore market competition
over credit card merchant fees by eliminating a contractual barrier with
anticompetitive effects.” 88 It was also brought in part in recognition of
governments across the globe bringing similar lawsuits or regulation in response to
“concerns about the high fees that credit card companies often charge merchants by
regulating such fees directly.”89 The Court’s decision here has a further reaching
effect than merchants. The decision could have been used to actually address such
consumer harm and welfare as the Chicago School purports to protect. It might
have “address[ed] the fundamental economic policy challenge of our time: reducing
income inequality.” 90 Instead it reinforced a “silent reverse Robin Hood system
transferring billions of dollars from working and middle class Americans who use
cash, debit, and prepaid cards, to the wealthy through elite platinum and black
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cards.”91 When presented with direct evidence of anticompetitive practices, Justice
Thomas and the majority, like the Chicago School, wanted “proof of lower market
wide output.” 92 Fixating on output ignores welfare altogether; in fact, “lack of
information can cause output to increase (as when consumers would buy ‘patent
medicines’ containing toxic poisons before drug-labeling laws were passed). Yet
that output increase comes at the expense of consumer welfare.” 93 This error,
propagated by the Chicago School, allowed for the Court to ignore every goal of
antitrust law.
If the Court had considered other factors – namely factors of fairness and
morality – they might have considered the effects their decision would have on
exacerbating inequality in America. Amex wrote into merchant contracts that they
could not charge customers more for using Amex despite the higher merchant
cost.94 While merchants have the decision whether or not to take a certain type of
credit card, those that accept Amex require “merchants to charge the same price
[which] means that customers who use cheaper forms of payment are in effect
subsidizing AmEx card holders.” 95 These merchant fees have profited Amex by
more than $5 billion during only one quarter.96 Those $5 billion profits get shared
with cardholders through cash back, frequent flier miles, hotel points, and other
more enticing rewards, allowing a wealthy family who charges $80,000 to credit
cards with a 1.5% cash back to earn nearly “two weeks of total earnings for the
median American family who earns $60,000 a year.”97
These cards with multitudes of beneficial rewards are used primarily by
wealthier customers. The lowest income individuals will use cash, prepaid cards,
and then debit cards before resorting to credit cards and even so, credit cards with
any sort of rewards are reserved for wealthier individuals. 98 And now, new
alternatives to companies like Amex, Discovery, Visa, etc. will face a high barrier to
entry; if they cannot “provide substantial benefits to wealthier customers” and
merchants cannot “price discriminate on payment forms” then those wealthier
customers have no reason to use alternative payment options. Merchants spread
91
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the cost of card fees across all customers and therefore the majority of cardholders
contribute to the luxuries of wealthy people with every transaction they make
throughout their day, likely without realizing it. A fairness principle would have
asked the Court to do the same kind of thorough analysis many critics of the Ohio v.
Am. Express Co. decision made. This type of analysis – one based in exploring how
an anticompetitive practice can intensify inequalities and ultimately raise prices for
consumers (ironic considering the Chicago School’s goals) – would have easily
allowed the Court to find that Amex’s anti-steering provisions violated federal
antitrust law.
D. AT&T and Time Warner Merger
The government also failed to block attempts at reclaiming robust antitrust
enforcement when it allowed AT&T and Time Warner – a “telecom giant” and
“multinational mass media and entertainment conglomerate” – to merge. 99 The
government here argued that “were this merger allowed to proceed, the newly
combined firm likely would – just as AT&T/DirecTV has already predicted – use its
control of Time Warner’s popular programming as a weapon to harm
competition.”100 Specifically, were the merger to be permitted, the “merger would
give the merged company the market power to weaken competing distributors’
ability to compete by raising their costs, would allow the merged company to
impede emerging and growing rivals, and furthermore, would result in increased
likelihood of oligopolistic coordination.”101
The merger, however, was blessed by Judge Leon on the court of appeals, and
the resulting merged company “will have unparalleled market power over both
content creation and distribution.”102 By consistently conflating internet platforms
with internet providers, the Court came to a concerning conclusion.103 Every internet
99
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platform requires internet providers. Judge Leon, identifying Facebook and Google
as similar examples to Time Warner and AT&T, fails to recognize that while
Facebook and Google will in many cases rely on AT&T or some other internet
provider for their services to be used, this merger “step[s] ahead of [every other
internet platform] in line by marrying Time Warner’s content to AT&T’s network.”104
And so it seems only inevitable that “[c]urrent regulatory trends are favoring the
concentration of economic power into a small number of larger businesses. Sadly,
there is ample history that when businesses obtain monopoly power they become
less interested in innovation or passing on margin improvements to consumers.”105
The government argued that the proposed merger would substantially harm
competition “by slowing the growth of emerging, innovative online distributors.”106
While the arguments in court were weak on both sides, critics outside of the court
recognized that AT&T would have the ability to “preinstall its own [content] services
and exclude them from data caps.”107 This business model forces content services to
compete with preinstalled content services through the same internet provider; one
firm essentially both competes with and only exists because of the other firm.
Market behavior of this kind should be considered an unfair competition practice.
Platform provision and subsequent competition with the very platform a firm is
forced to use allows the providing firm to monopolize by squeezing out every
competitor.
Once again, the Chicago School of Thought is utilized in a court considering the
anticompetitive effects of some action – in this case a mega-merger – to downplay
the injury on consumers. Robert Bork, as previously discussed, is primarily
concerned with economic efficiencies and allowing large firms to thrive. 108
Antitrust is perceived as a threat to large firms thriving and thus “[s]tripped of any
social or moral purpose, antitrust lost its mojo, and was progressively relegated to

doing. But neither Facebook nor Google owns the ultimate distribution layer of the consumer connection
to the internet… Tech companies might have vertically integrated the creation and production of content
with consumer-facing apps and services, but they all depend on internet connections to reach their
audiences… AT&T and Time Warner aren’t trying to catch up to Netflix by merging; they’re trying to step
ahead of them in line by marrying Time Warner’s content to AT&T’s network.
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little more than pursuing the most blatant forms of collusion.”109 Cases like Ohio v.
Am. Express Co. and the AT&T merger with Time Warner reflect that “[b]y trusting
dominant firm strategies and leading firm collaborations to produce efficiency,
modern U.S. antitrust protects monopoly and oligopoly, suppresses innovative
challenges, and stifles efficiency.” 110 The market economy, whether the Chicago
School acknowledges it or not, requires “trust, fairness, and pro-social behavior” to
function.111 But as these cases have shown, antitrust policy continues to ignore these
values, and treats market participants as amoral, self-interested profitmaximizers.”112 Chicago School purists missed the elementary lessons on fairness.
Fairness considerations for them “contaminat[e] antitrust . . . [and] would amount
to undesirable arbitrariness in enforcement.”113
E. Amazon
The rapid success of internet platform giant Amazon, at more than 46% control
of U.S. e-commerce, is yet another example of how modern antitrust policy and
theory fails to protect consumers and promote competition. 114 In nearly every
economic market, Amazon has at least some presence, and in many its presence has
obliterated competing firms. One simple example is Amazon’s effect on the e-book
market. Its business model consisted of selling e-books below cost. While many
would refer to that as predatory pricing, the “government perceived Amazon’s cost
cutting as benign, focusing on the profitability of e-books in the aggregate and
characterizing the company’s pricing of bestsellers as ‘loss leading.’” 115 When
Amazon began selling Kindles, wholesale publisher prices did not drop, nor did the
price of manufacturing Kindles.116 Rather, Amazon chose to deliberately price the
e-books and device below the purchase and manufacturing cost.117 This approach
allowed them control and the ability to monopolize nearly 90% of the e-book
market.118
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Book publishers feared Amazon could lead to a permanent reduction to a
consumer’s willingness to pay a certain price for any book. In response, they began
working with Apple to publish e-books at the publisher’s own price, and Apple would
receive 30% of the profit. 119 This led to a lawsuit against Apple, alleging price
collusion. 120 Arguments that the DOJ should be investigating Amazon’s pricing
strategies failed, as the DOJ found “‘persuasive evidence lacking’ to show that the
company had engaged in predatory practices.”121 Instead, the government found
that “‘from the time of its launch, Amazon’s e-book distribution business has been
consistently profitable, even when substantially discounting some newly released
and bestselling titles.’”122
One explanation for how Amazon was able to get away with textbook predatory
pricing was by characterizing cost cutting as loss leading. Amazon argued that the
reduction in price for the e-book and Kindle was temporary and used to sell more of
those products, not harm e-book competitors and raise prices. 123 Loss leading
versus predatory pricing can be determined by considering “intensity” and “intent,”
which motivate the cost cutting tactics.124 Here, the Court found Amazon did not
aim to “drive out competing e-book sellers and acquire the power to increase e-book
prices.”125 Such logic might be applicable to a physical store, but courts are wholly
unequipped to deal with the changing landscape of internet retail.
As Lina Khan in her widely respected article Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox
explained, if a consumer goes to Walmart because of a heavy discount on the price
of socks one day, it does not follow that the same consumer will return to Walmart
because of the sock purchase – but they may return because they are now aware
Walmart has good prices.126 However, if a consumer goes to Amazon to purchase
the discount version of a bestseller book, they will be inclined to return for many
reasons, not just because it is a “good bargain.”127 One reason is that e-book sellers,
including Amazon, use “digital rights management” (DRM) to “limit the types of
devices that can read certain e-book formats[,]” and therefore a Kindle purchaser
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must continue to order from Amazon’s platform.128
Another reason is that buying and browsing on Amazon gives Amazon
information about the consumer’s “reading habits and preferences, data [which] the
company uses to tailor recommendations and future deals.” 129 Because this
consumer decided to purchase the Kindle and e-book when prices were slashed
below any profitability for Amazon, they are unknowingly (or perhaps knowingly)
locked in to only purchasing from Amazon in the future. They are highly unlikely to
go and purchase a Nook for instance and repurchase the books they bought on
Amazon so they can continue reading on their new device, or to purchase an e-book
for the first time “even if that company is slashing prices.”130 While Amazon may
have initially lowered bestseller prices of e-books “to sell more e-books generally,
that tactic has also positioned Amazon to dominate the market in a way that sets it
up to raise future prices. In this context, the traditional distinction between loss
leading and predatory pricing is strained.”131
The current antitrust framework – specifically the predatory pricing
framework in this instance – fails to grasp the degree of harm slashing prices
coupled with sheer market power can have on consumer welfare and the broader
economy. If courts considered this issue under a pre-Chicago School lens, they
would recognize “the harm to the diversity and vibrancy of ideas in the book market”
or “the risk that Amazon may retaliate against books that it disfavors – either to
impose greater pressure on publishers or for other political reasons.” 132 Where
publishers were once able to “take risks with heavier books that might not be as
popular . . . [and] subsidize them with best sellers[,]” now “Amazon’s demand for
discounts has made it harder to cross-subsidize this way, leading to consolidation
among book publishers and reduced diversity.”133 This utter power Amazon is able
to exert over just one market it controls begins to show how dangerous the lack of
antitrust enforcement and the court system’s willingness to overlook
anticompetitive practices can be. A question about fairness beyond the simple
question of efficiency and whether prices are low would force courts to undertake a
more thorough review of the facts and motivations. Here, a court could have easily
found that the risk of total market domination by Amazon was high, and it would
be both an unfair competitive practice raising the entry bar for new participants in
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the market and would ultimately injure consumers in a variety of ways.
Amazon’s anticompetitive prices that ought to have been blocked by courts long
ago is not isolated to just the e-book marketplace. Yet another example amongst
many is Amazon’s acquisition of Quidsi, one if its early rivals. One of Quidsi’s
subsidiaries was Diapers.com. In 2009, Amazon expressed an interest in acquiring
Quidsi, which they declined.134 In response, Amazon used price bots to monitor
Quidsi’s prices and adjust Amazon’s prices to match its competitor while slashing
diaper and baby product pricing by 30%. 135 Through several other cost cutting
strategies, Quidsi predicted that Amazon was “on track to lose $100 million over
three months in the diaper category alone.”136 Quidsi investors “grew wary” and its
owners entered talks with Walmart to sell the business, but Amazon intervened with
“an aggressive counteroffer.” 137 Largely out of fear, Quidsi made a deal with
Amazon.138 Amazon, in only a matter of months of eliminating one of its only key
rivals, began drastically raising prices and reducing benefits.139 Consumers grew
frustrated with the “much less generous” platform and online forum users “said they
would be taking their business from Amazon and returning to Diapers.com –
which, other users pointed out, was no longer possible.”140
Thus, one of the key options for consumers – to take their business elsewhere –
was eliminated. The ability to ‘vote with one’s dollar’ or to prefer a certain brand
over another for more than cost alone has become nearly impossible. 141 There is
always a trade-off when a consumer purchases goods. One typical trade-off might
be between “the more sustainable, ethical, fair-trade option or the cheaper,
potentially dodgier one.”142 For instance, a consumer looking to purchase skincare
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may choose to spend his or her money on a brand like The Ordinary. The Ordinary
is known for not testing on animals or allowing their products to be sold in countries
requiring animal testing and is therefore one of the few vegan brands.
Furthermore, its parent company, DECIEM also does not participate in animal
testing.143 However, Estée Lauder recently acquired DECIEM for $1 billion and a
majority stake in the company with an agreement to purchase the remaining
interest after three years.144 Estée Lauder is not cruelty free and both allows and
encourages its products to be sold in countries where animal testing is required.145
Strict vegans, or those ethically opposed to animal cruelty, may find that their use
of their dollars in the market no longer reflects their interest in cruelty free skincare.
This is not meant to argue that Estée Lauder is participating in anticompetitive
practices, but rather to stand as one prominent example of how consumers have
seen their ability to ‘vote with their dollar’ reduced due to pervasive horizontal
integration across many markets. One fundamental, moral aspect of competitive
markets “is that individual desires are collectively expressed as market demand,
which, in turn, is a signal to producers to supply the desired goods or services.
However, where we have one seller (monopoly) or one buyer (monopsony), there is
no ‘collective’ desire but instead the desire of the monopolists or monopsonist.”146
A more relevant example is Amazon’s recent acquisition of Whole Foods. At one
point, the CEO of Whole Foods, John Mackey, “was at the vanguard of a movement
to make business more ethical.” 147 Mackey’s ideals with Whole Foods included
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“conscious capitalism – where a firm has a purpose beyond profit.”148 Its sale to
Amazon – a company with a “reputation for squeezing its suppliers … and for
pushing its workers harder than most (in one notorious case, warehouse workers
suffered heat exhaustion and had to receive medical attention)” – has for many
consumers represented a divergence from its original mission statement.149 Many
consumers had bought into the idea of Whole Foods as ‘conscious capitalism’ and a
way to ethically consume under capitalism by reducing one’s carbon footprint and
buying local. However, Amazon’s purchase had customers questioning their
grocery habits. If their original goal was to shop at a more environmentally friendly
grocery store, Whole Foods is now owned by a company emitting “51.17 million
metric tons of carbon dioxide.”150 If they originally shopped at Whole Foods because
it paid workers livable wages, they were now aware of the grueling conditions its
parent company’s employees worked in.151 This reduction in consumer choice based
on a large firm acquisition emphasizes a need for courts to consider what effect a
merger or anticompetitive practice may pose to consumer choice and that either can
injure consumers in ways other than price alone.
Amazon at this point is unbeatable. Its total size and ability to psychologically
intimidate its competitors into submission have made it difficult, if not impossible,
to compete with it. Numerous contenders have approached the challenge, only to
be acquired by large firms.152 Even large firms like Target have failed on its online
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platform to pose any threat to Amazon’s dominance.153 In fact, the top two through
ten U.S. companies in retail e-commerce’s sale shares combined do not begin to
approach Amazon’s dominance in that market.154 The Chicago School encourages
this behavior that has led to great inequality and consumer harm across the U.S.
and the globe. Their push for “efficient” firms to go unregulated and be allowed to
“thrive” has extinguished innovation and diversity in the marketplace, thereby
raising the barriers of entry to the market so high that large firms are effectively
granted a right to monopolize.
III. MOVEMENT TO REINVIGORATE ANTITRUST LAW & REINTRPDUCING
FAIRNESS AND MORALITY CONSIDERATIONS

Market competition is based on three factors: moral, economic, and political.155
The Chicago School’s tunnel vision on economic theory “has resulted in a failure to
deal with markets in their totality and with a holistic approach.” 156 Growing
concerns about market concentration and wealth inequality do not exist in a
vacuum. A movement to address significant issues of disparity in the U.S. through
antitrust law as one prescription to the problem is emerging in legislation, in
academia, and in the popular mindset of the public. Using fairness considerations
comes as both an advantageous solution and a precursor to potentially more
problems:
Stiglitz157 has suggested that “policies aimed at reducing market power can accordingly
play some role in the reduction of inequality,” which would contribute towards reaping
morally desirable results through the application of antitrust. At the same time, fairness
considerations should not be seen as a blank check for capricious, arbitrary
enforcement. Fairness sceptic George Stigler once described the f word as “a suitcase
full of bottled ethics from which one freely chooses to blend his own type of justice.”
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Without some bright lines, the pursuit of fair competition could turn into chaotic à la
carte enforcement.158

Recognition that markets are not perfectly competitive and that the invisible hand
meant to “provide the freedom of choice that allows individual consumption
decisions to guide societal resources” does not exist so rationally leads to the
conclusion that there are more factors at play – like important humanitarian
elements and changing society values – than just economic theory.159
A working competitive market requires the contemporaneous operation of
homo moralicus and homo economicus. 160 Aversion to a morality pillar is
comprehensible. Morality is not a black or white interpretation. Rather, it almost
exclusively lives in a grey space:
With no shared view on morality, and an unwillingness to deal with what appear to be
religious imperatives dressed up as some sort of human morality, it is entirely
understandable why, unlike the emergence of behavior economics in economic theory,
there has been little to convince competition lawyers and regulators to shift from the
objective justification of classical economics. But it is suggested that morality in the
modern landscape may be more accurately recast as fairness.161

Reducing antitrust analyses to objective economic calculations lets courts view
economics as “a value-free science” and not as one informed by “years of
socialization and the internalization of social, moral, ethical, and legal norms.”162
Fairness as part of the antitrust analysis is not a new concept. In fact, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) in its 2010 merger guidelines acknowledged market
power is not confined to economic harms; rather, it can manifest as “non-price
harms, including in the form of reduced product quality, reduced product variety,
reduced service, or diminished innovation.” 163 The Obama Administration also
opposed the mega-merger of its time between Comcast and Time Warner for
reasons of market access, not necessarily price concerns.164
The federal legislature has also taken steps to restore the antimonopoly goals of
antitrust law. The Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative
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Law, as part of a bipartisan effort, addressed the dominance of internet platforms
like Apple, Amazon, Facebook, and Google. Through the investigation into online
competition, the subcommittee undertook a review of “existing antitrust laws,
competition policies, and current enforcement levels to assess whether they are
adequate to address market power and anticompetitive conduct in digital
markets.”165 The report recognized that Courts have narrowly construed consumer
welfare as “the sole goal of antitrust law” and thus “limited the analysis of
competitive harm to focus primarily on price and output rather than the
competitive process – contravening legislative history and legislative intent.”166 The
report went on to acknowledge that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was
created to prohibit unfair competition methods, and enabled the FTC to “‘make
rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the [FTC Act] provisions,’ as
well as broad investigative authority to compel business information and conduct
market studies.”167 These provisions were established to
reach beyond the other antitrust statutes, “to fill in the gaps in the other antitrust laws,
to round them out and make their coverage complete.” Lawmakers delegated to the FTC
the task of defining what constituted an “unfair method of competition,” recognizing
that an expert agency equipped to continuously monitor business practices would be
best positioned to ensure the legal definition kept pace with business realities.168

These roles have been largely neglected. The DOJ and the FTC conducted a
wholescale disavowal of legislative directives, congressional intent, and antitrust
law, which the report recognized as a significant reason behind failing to address
market concentration and monopolization.169
Politicians in congress and in the 2020 presidential election used antitrust
legislation as a platform for their campaign. Elizabeth Warren, former presidential
candidate and current senator for Massachusetts, coauthored a bill named the AntiMonopoly and Competition Restoration Act.170 Her proposed legislation focuses not
only on regulating merger-acquisition activity, but also on “any companies with
Investigation of Competition in Digit. Mkts., Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com., and
Admin. L. of the Comm. on the Judiciary 6 (2020), https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
competition_in_digital_markets.pdf#page=6 [https://perma.cc/TP83-3GAW].
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buying power, which could include corporations with market share as low as
25% . . . [and] all companies with more than $40 billion in sales.”171 The bill explicitly
acknowledges that antitrust laws “were created to protect fair, open, and
competitive markets and to prevent corporations from abusing their power to stifle
competition.” 172 As part of her presidential platform, Senator Warren wanted to
appoint regulators to use the existing antitrust laws to unwind anticompetitive
mergers amongst the largest tech companies, including Amazon, Facebook, and
Google.173 This proposition acknowledged that it wouldn’t “solve every problem we
have with our big tech companies,” but that:
Small businesses would have a fair shot to sell their products on Amazon without the
fear of Amazon pushing them out of business. Google couldn’t smother competitors by
demoting their products on Google Search. Facebook would face real pressure from
Instagram and WhatsApp to improve the user experience and protect our privacy. Tech
entrepreneurs would have a fighting chance to compete against the tech giants.174

Senator Warren’s platform was based fundamentally on what could level the playing
field for competitors and give them a fair chance in the marketplace. Her platform
is evidence of the growing concern over fairness in the marketplace and using
antitrust as a means to address that concern.
Other likeminded senators have brought similar bills before Congress. Senator
Amy Klobuchar’s recent bill, entitled the Competition and Antitrust Law
Enforcement Reform Act and “cosponsored by Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Commerce Committee members Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (DNJ), Ed Markey (D-MA), and Brian Schatz (D-HI), promises to empower federal
enforcers with the tools to fight against anticompetitive conduct.” Specifically, the
bill endeavors to “increase enforcement resources,” “strengthen prohibitions
against anticompetitive mergers . . . [by] updat[ing] the legal standards for
permissible mergers [and] shift[ing] the burden to the merging parties to prove
their merger will not violate the law,” “prevent harmful dominant firm conduct,”
“establish a new, independent FTC division to conduct market studies and merger
retrospectives,” and “implement additional reforms to enhance antitrust
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enforcement.”175 The legislation is a sweeping proposal to reinvigorate antitrust’s
effectiveness in part by preventing monopolies before they are established.
Harmful competitive actions and “exclusionary conduct can be stopped before it is
too late, and the harm is locked in. It extends the reach of the law so that blocking
others from a fair chance to compete is a violation, even before a monopoly
results.”176
Returning to antitrust’s original values – particularly those values completely
ignored by courts today – requires recognition that American “[a]ntitrust has
moved too far from democratic institutions and toward technocratic control, in
service to a laissez-faire approach to antitrust enforcement.”177 Congress originally
strove to balance and blend the fundamental values of antitrust law and “protect our
economic system from undue concentrations and exercises of economic power and
their ‘destructive consequences in a free society.’” 178 Supporters of the current
antitrust status quo treat neoconservative economic values as a “neutral set of
scientifically objective economic laws” when they ought to be recognized as the
“values-laden political, social, moral and economic ideologies they are. By doing so,
we can return to balancing and blending in our antitrust analyses the fundamental
American political, social, moral, and economic values that Congress has paid
homage to for more than a century.”179 The dominant economic goal in the U.S. is
to create a healthy, stable, and sustainable capitalistic economic system – to do that,
“values such as competitive fairness, level economic playing fields, economic
justice, a healthy diversity of competitors, and reduced economic concentration are
actually crucial economic values.”180 Each factor – social, political, economic, and
moral – is vital to reforming antitrust law, but this paper has focused on the easiest
factor to accomplish and which courts are already prepared to handle.
Recognizing that fairness or morality ought to be at least part of a court’s
consideration in an antitrust suit is the first step, and while characterizing fairness
as a steadfast rule faithful to antitrust’s goals’ roots seems more difficult, courts are
fully equipped to make fairness assessments in court. In the same way “athletic
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contests distinguish between fair and foul play, the law distinguishes between fair
and unfair methods of competition.”181 Antitrust law already plainly contemplates
fairness and as one treatise provides,
On ethical, religious, and social sources, American law has developed a minimum level
or standard of fairness in competitive rivalry. The law of unfair competition has
developed as a kind of Marquis of Queensbury code for competitive infighting. To
pursue the analogy, it would be equally as unacceptable for the contestants in a prizefight to agree privately to ‘throw the fight’ as it would be for one contestant to insert a
horseshoe in his glove.”182

Courts are prepared to determine fairness. For example, the entire fairness
doctrine is used when the presumption of the business judgment rule is defeated.183
Under the entire fairness test, courts consider whether a transaction is fair as to
process and price:
Fair dealing encompasses questions of process, including how the transaction is timed,
initiated, structured, negotiated, and disclosed, and how the approvals of the directors
and the stockholders are obtained. Fair price relates to the economic and financial
terms of the transaction, including any relevant factors that affect the intrinsic or
inherent value of the corporation, such as the market value and assets of the
corporation, a pro forma analysis or other valuation metrics, and possibly a solvency
opinion to ensure that the transaction will not render the corporation insolvent. The
fair dealing and fair price components are not viewed in isolation, but, rather, in
conjunction. Entire fairness requires the court to strictly scrutinize all aspects of a
transaction to ensure fairness.184

Courts already consider complicated questions of economics and business actions
under a fairness consideration. To be clear, this is just one example of how the
courts are already prepared to resolve complicated matters of fairness but is not
necessarily the solution for fairness in antitrust law. Rather, the entire fairness rule
is used to show that the Chicago School unnecessarily fears arbitrariness in
antitrust analysis and that courts ought not to make a wholesale disavowal of
fairness considerations in antitrust suits as a result.185 Reintroducing fairness back
to antitrust analyses is neither new nor difficult for courts. This would substantially
level the marketplace and change the outcome of cases that proponents of the
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Hipster Antitrust movement consider wrongly decided.
CONCLUSION

A perfectly efficient and rational marketplace is a myth, yet the Chicago School
relies on that myth – alongside an invisible hand – to take due care of the economy.
It is simply not enough. Antitrust law was originally proffered as a solution to
monopolies based on social, moral, political, and economic goals. The bleak future
of antitrust law in America might still be saved, however, if legislators and the
courts seriously consider reformulating their analysis. They might start by asking
whether the action before them is fair.
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